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Religious Postmarital Dispute Resolution:
Jewish Marriage Contracts and Civil Courts
I. INTRODUCTION
The resolution of marital problems can take many different forms
such as conciliation, mediation, and counseling. But when a marriage
breaks down completely, there are only two results recognized by the
civil courts of the United States-a termination of marriage signalled
by either a divorce or a dissolution decree.' Even in instances where
the parties mutually agree to terminate their marriage, the state requires
an official divorce or dissolution, which defines the legal duties of the
parties.2
There are many circumstances, however, in which official divorces
do not fully resolve the dispute between the parties. In those circum-
stances, the parties need recourse to alternate methods.3 This is the
case when Jewish people seek not only civil divorce, but also divorce
recognized within their faith. "To the Orthodox Hebrew, it is as crucial
to the legitimacy of divorce as it was to wedlock that religious rites be
followed scrupulously. ' '4 In order for a Jewish couple to be divorced,
the husband must release his wife, and the wife must accept the release.
This release is called a get. Only after the husband releases the wife,
will the woman be free to marry again in her religion.' If the release
is not given, and the woman remarries regardless, any children born to
this union, which is not formed within the faith, will be considered
illegitimate.6
The requirement for Jewish divorces compels several difficult ques-
tions. First, are religious courts better suited than civil courts to address
domestic disputes? Often, divorce is seen as a termination of marriage
as well as a resolution of any conflicts which stem from it. Consequently,
there is no reason for the court to lay a groundwork upon which the
parties may build an ongoing relationship. 7 In truth, however, conflicts
1. Jones v. Jones, 136 Me. 238, 8 A.2d 141 (1939).
2. Bleich, Jewish Divorce: Judicial Misconceptions and
Possible Means of Civil Enforcement, 16 CONN. L. REv. 201, 227 & n.80 (1984).
3. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DIsPuTE RESOLUTION 313 (1985). "It
is important that any dispute settlement system help to facilitate constructive relationships
in the future .... Even in ... cases [where families are seeking divorce] there will be
continuing relations between the parties concerning financial and child-rearing questions."
4. Meislin, Jewish Divorce in American Courts, 16 J. FAM. L. 19, 19 (1977-1978).
5. Warmflash, The New York Approach to Enforcing Religious Marriage Contracts:
From Avitzur to the Get Statute, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 229, 234 (1984).
6. Id. at 234. See also 2 J. BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 103
(1983) and infra text accompanying note 22.
7. Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After
Divorce, 64 TEx. L. REv. 687, 735-36 (1985).
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may continue to arise between the parties, particularly in such areas as
child support and visitation. Consequently, mediation before divorce is
instumental in enabling parties to cooperate. Mediation may be the only
way to avoid the disputes which arise postdivorce. In addition, if
problems do arise, the couple could again use mediation to resolve the
controversies. This way, the postdivorce relationship is not destroyed by
acrimony resulting from court proceedings. Because the couple will be
involved in a "continuing relationship," they should handle conflict
through procedures that emphasize reconciliation and mutual decisions. 9
Religious arbitration and mediation allow the parties to resolve their
disputes without destroying the necessary continuing relationship.
Second, if religious arbitration must exist in concert with civil divorce
in order to solidify the status of Jewish divorces, how can secular courts
uphold, promote, and administer such religious decisions without violating
the establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution? The establishment clause forbids state action which pro-
motes the establishment of any religion. 10 It is not yet clear whether a
court's action in upholding or compelling a religious divorce is
unconstitutional.II
This Note will first examine the Jewish legal system and how it deals
with divorce. Then it will reveal the dilemma civil courts encounter
when attempting to grant complete divorce without violating first amend-
ment prohibitions.
II. THE JEWISH LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Ketubah
The ketubah is at the core of a traditional Jewish marriage. The
ketubah is a contract setting forth the rights and obligations of the
parties to be married.' 2 The husband's principal obligations which Jewish
law demands are that he provide for his wife's physical and monetary
needs. He must also fulfill the requirements necessary in the event of
a get.'3 The ketubah is a "lien and a prior claim on the husband's
estate with respect to all property owned by him during his lifetime,
8. Comment, The Best Interest of the Divorcing Family-Mediation Not Litigation,
29 Loy. L. REV. 55, 68-73 (1983).
9. Yngvesson, Re-Examining Continuing Relations and the Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv.
623, 624.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ." Id.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 54-76.
12. Warmflash, supra note 5, at 232. See also 2 J. BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC
PROBLEMS 89 (1983).
13. I. HAUT, DIVORCE IN JEWISH LAW AND LIFE 7 (1983).
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and in the event of his death or divorce, is paid out of the 'best' and
'desirable' portions thereof."' 14 The ketubah, therefore, makes provision
for the distribution of assets between the parties in the event of a get.
The ketubah has three parts: the main ketubah, which sets forth a
specific amount the wife will receive in the event of a get; the ketubah
increment, which establishes an optional, incremental addition to the
main ketubah; and the return, which stipulates that all money the wife
brought into the marriage will be returned to her in the event of
divorce.' 5
B. The Get
A Jewish marriage terminates within the faith in only two ways: if
one of the spouses dies or if the husband and wife obtain the get.
16
Originally, the get consisted of the husband driving the unwanted wife
from his property.'7 Consequently, the rule developed that only husbands
could obtain the get, because the wife had no property of her own.' s
Throughout its development, Jewish philosophers have defined various
acceptable grounds for the get. The most common view is that of the
School of Hillel, which holds that a husband may obtain a get whenever
there is cause, hoivever slight.19 The get is considered the personal
rescission of a contract, and Jewish law looks with disfavor upon attempts
to breach this personal relationship. 20 For this reason, if any person
except the bet din, a rabbinical arbitration council, uses force to compel
the husband to obtain a get, the get will not be considered valid in the
faith.2' If the wife should remarry without receiving a get from her
civilly divorced husband, the Jewish faith will consider her marriage
adultery, and any children of the marriage will be mamzer, or illegit-
imate.22The faith will consider her an "agunah," a woman still anchored
to her husband.23 Hence, religious leaders recognized that women in
intolerable marriages needed a method to effectuate a valid get while
avoiding the stigma of agunah.
In response to this problem, the bet din developed the constructive
consent, so that it could force the reluctant husband to grant a get.24
14. Id. at 9.
15. Bleich, supra note 2, at 201.
16. Id.
17. L. EPSTEIN, THE JEWISH MARRIAGE CoNTRAcr 200 (1973).
18. Id. See also I. HAUr, supra note 13, at 20.
19. I. HAUr, supra note 13, at 20.
20. Id.
21. Bleich, supra note 2, at 287. See also L. EPSTEIN supra note 17, at 206.
22. B. MEISLIN, JEWISH LAW IN AMERICAN TRIBUNALS 71 (1976).
23. See Warmflash, supra note 5, at 234.
24. Note, Jewish Divorce and Secular Courts: The Promise of Avitzur, 73 GEO.
L.J. 193, 200-01 (1984).
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Historically, the bet din was able to exert whatever pressure it felt
warranted, including physical force, to compel a reluctant husband to
grant a get.25 The pressure the bet din exerts today is still effective,
although it is more limited. The pressure is "moral and social," rather
than economic or physical.2 6 The bet din is still the only body which
can render the legal fiction of constructive consent. Although a secular
or civil court cannot compel a valid get,27 it can compel the husband
to obey the bet din's ruling and the fiction would still result. The bet
din is always required in cases where the get must be compelled because
the rules regarding the get are so intricate.2
C. The Seder Haget
The seder haget, or get procedure, is a complex procedure which
requires both the writing and the delivery of the get. The get itself has
many technical requirements which must be met in order for it to be
fully effective. The get must set forth the Jewish calendar date, and
the names, including the nicknames, and the residences of the parties.29
Most importantly, the get must contain a complete and explicit statement
explaining the separation of the parties.30 The separation must be un-
conditional so that the woman may remarry at will. If the separation
limits the wife's ability to remarry, the bill of divorce may be invalid.'
The actual seder haget is the ceremony where the husband releases
the wife. The bet din need not, and usually does not, officiate. Instead,
an individual rabbi oversees the proceeding. The husband, the wife, a
scribe, and two witnesses are present at the proceeding. 2 The rabbi
asks the husband if he is giving the get under any compulsion, and, if
so, will free him of the compulsion. The husband must give the paper
and pen to the scribe and ask him to produce a get "without flaw both
in the writing and in the attestation."33 When the scribe has written the
get, the witnesses must sign it, and the husband or his agent must
deliver it to the wife, or her agent.3 4 When the husband delivers the
bill directly to the wife, she must take it freely and without help into
her own hands. If the husband gives the get, he must say: "This is
25. Id. at 201.
26. Id.
27. L. EPSTEIN, supra note 17, at 206. See also B. MEISLIN, supra note 22, at 74
(quoting MAIMONIDES: LAWS OF DIVORCE, cap. 2, 20).
28. Meislin, supra note 4, at 21.
29. I. HAUJT, supra note 13, at 27.
30. Id. at 27-28.
31. Id. Certain restraining clauses were, however, permitted. For instance, a husband
could make it a condition that his divorced wife not marry a certain man.
32. Id. at 31-32. The scribe cannot also be a witness, and the scribe cannot be related
to either the husband or the wife.
33. Id. at 33.
34. Id. at 34.
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your get, and you are divorced by it from me, and are permitted to
marry any man. '35 At the rabbi's request, the wife will either return
the ketubah or waive its provisions. 36 The procedure is lengthy and
complex and, therefore, the bet din is the only body with the expertise
and knowledge to compel it.
D. The Bet Din
The bet din (or beth din) is, as previously discussed, a rabbinical
arbitration council.37 The council consists of three rabbis. Each of the
married partners selects one rabbi, and these two rabbis select the third
member.38 Historically, batei din were standing panels which adjudicated
disputes in fixed geographic areas.39 As geographic concentrations of
Jewish people shifted, the various batei din were usually not seated
bodies, but were called when necessary. 40 In the United States, batei
din are formed within denominational frameworks. The Orthodox Jews
have one standing bet din in the Jewish community of Washington
Heights in New York City.4 1 The Orthodox Rabbinical Council of
America also sponsors local batei din in large cities.42 Conservative Jews
sponsor one national bet din at the Jewish Theological Seminary. Likewise,
individual rabbis sponsor ad hoc batei din when they are necessary. 43
The bet din domestic relations function now consists of administering
get proceedings, but the responsibility to encourage conciliation whenever
possible remains. Although the batei din cannot compel counseling as
a prerequisite for a get, they have the discretion to delay granting the
get where they feel that such delay might result in conciliation. Likewise,
the terms of the ketubah, which spell out the financial repercussions
of the get, sometimes provide considerable incentive to the parties to
mediate their differences before they go through the get procedure. 4
III. THE POSITION OF RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION IN SECULAR COURTS
A. Gets Granted Outside of the United States Courts
Secular courts in the United States generally will recognize a get
which the parties obtained in a foreign jurisdiction if the get meets
35. Id. at 39.
36. Id. at 40.
37. See text accompanying notes 24 to 28.
38. B. MEISLIN, supra note 22, at 122-23.
39. Id. at 121-22.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 123.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Note, supra note 24, at 198.
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basic jurisdictional requirements. The first jurisdictional requirement is
that both parties or their representatives appear after receiving adequate
notice of the hearing.45 Another requirement is that the country in which
the parties obtained the get must recognize its validity.46 On their face,
these requirements seem reasonable. At times, however, courts have had
trouble making the distinction between gets which foreign law governs
and those which American law governs. When the husband resides in
the United States and wishes to divorce his wife, residing in another
country, he will have the get drafted in the United States and taken
by messenger to his wife.4 7 American courts have presumed that this
kind of get was a product of American invention and hence invalid
under controlling American law.48 Jewish scholars argue that the law
of the. country where the wife lives governs the get because the get
cannot take legal effect until it has been delivered.4 9 Therefore, courts
in the United States should recognize these gets as valid.
A recent New York case dealt with this issue. In The Matter of
Sandra S. v. Glenn M. S.,50 a couple was married in New York and
later moved to Israel. The husband-respondent thereafter returned to
New York. The wife-petitioner sought custody and support through the
rabbinical court in Israel. The husband was reluctant to undergo the
get proceedings in Israel because he believed the resulting divorce would
not be valid in New York.5 Although the parties had not yet obtained
the get at the time the court rendered the decision, the court stated
that a get so procured "would probably be valid in New York State. '5 2
B. The Status of the Get Within United States Jurisdictions
The principal problem with obtaining the get in the United States
is not recognition of validity. Rather, the conflict is between the religious
requirements for a valid get and American constitutional prohibitions
against church-state entanglements. If a civil court in the United States
forced a husband to grant his civilly divorced wife a get, this might
arguably violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. 3 The
resultant get would also be invalid under Jewish law. 54 The establishment
45. Meislin, supra note 4, at 21-22.
46. Bleich, supra note 2, at 207-08.
47. I. HAUT, supra note 13, at 34-35.
48. Bleich, supra note 2, at 216-17.
49. Id.
50. 133 Misc. 2d 370, 506 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986).
51. Id. at 376, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
52. Id.
53. Bleich, supra note 2, at 227. This article features a complete discussion of the
constitutional and other legal problems of Jewish religious divorce.
54. Note, supra note 24, at 210.
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clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, prohibits government action
which (1) lacks a secular purpose, (2) has the primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion, or (3) entangles the government with religion to
an excessive degree. 5  The resulting dilemma traps thousands of American
Jewish women, making remarriage within their faith impossible. Con-
sequently, the civil courts are striving to address the dilemma, and this
response has centered on the bet din.
If the ketubah, or a settlement agreement made at the time of civil
divorce, contains an explicit provision that the parties will have a bet
din arbitrate any marital controversy, the courts can uphold the clause
and force bet din arbitration.16 Parties to commercial and employment
contracts frequently include dispute resolution clauses in the contracts.
These clauses "are enforced almost universally, and attempts to evade
such agreements are discouraged by courts' declarations that strong
public policy favors arbitration. 57 In family law, mediated settlement
agreements frequently feature clauses establishing arbitration for future
disputes. In New York, however, the courts are split in which circum-
stances they should enforce these clauses. 8 If the disputes concern
alimony, property division, or child support, New York courts will
generally uphold the arbitration clause.59 However, if the parties dispute
the custody or visitation provisions of a settlement agreement, the courts
have not always enforced arbitration clauses.60 There are many reasons
why courts are less likely to permit parties to submit custody disputes
to binding arbitration. Principal among these is the court's interpretation
of its parens patriae responsibility.6' For example, the first and second
departments of the New York appellate division have split on the question
of enforcing arbitration in custody cases. The first department has held
that arbitration is permissible, but when one challenges an arbitration
decision, the court will examine the decision to determine whether the
best interests of the child have been served.6 2 Conversely, the second
55. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
56. Bleich, supra note 2, at 248-49. See also Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d
366, 373 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
57. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public
Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REv. 481, 482 (1981).
58. Meroney, Mediation and Arbitration of Separation and Divorce Agreements, 15
VAKE FOREST L. REV. 467, 483-84 (1979).
59. Id. at 483.
60. Id. at 484.
61. Philbrick, Agreements to Arbitrate Post-Divorce Custody Disputes, 18 COLUM.
J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 419, 447 (1985). Parens patriae refers traditionally to the role of
the state as a sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
62. Sheets v. Sheets, 22 A.D.2d 176, 179, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320, 325 (N.Y. App. Div.
1964).
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department has held that courts are "better suited [than arbitration]
to reach the ultimate objective" of serving the child's best interest.63
In a case where a settlement agreement included a clause providing
for a get, the New York Court of Appeals, in Avitzur v. Avitzur,64
followed the trend of courts dealing with arbitration clauses in disputes
which do not involve custody. The court rejected defendant husband's
argument that enforcing the ketukah would violate the establishment
clause of the Constitution.65 Instead, the court held that the plaintiff
was entitled to specific performance of the contract and that defendant
must "perform a secular obligation to which he contractually bound
himself. '6 6 In this way, the court avoided the constitutional prohibition,
by merely enforcing a private contract between individuals, albeit the
contract has a religious content. The court also avoided the risk of
invalidating the resulting get by leaving the actual compulsion of con-
structive consent to the only body which can effectively complete it,
the bet din.67
In New York, courts have taken another approach to the problem
of agunah. New York Domestic Relations Law Section 253 requires in
part:
Any party to a marriage.., who commences a proceeding to annul the marriage or
for a divorce must allege, in his or her verified complaint, (i) that, to the best of
his or her knowledge, that he or she has taken, or will take, prior to the entry of
final judgment, all steps solely within his or her power to remove any barrier to the
defendant's remarriage following the annulment or divorce. 6
Courts can apply this statute to force a reluctant husband to arrange
for the bet din if he has begun a civil divorce action. The law, however,
does not address those situations where the Jewish wife begins the civil
divorce action. As the plaintiff, the law requires her to remove non-
existent impediments to her husband's remarriage, but cannot compel
the removal of the very real religious impediment to her own remarriage.
In addition, the law is vulnerable to constitutional challenge. When
63. Agur v. Agur, 32 A.D.2d 16, 20, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772, 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
It is interesting to note that the Agur decision involved a contract to arbitrate child
custody disputes in accordance with Jewish religious law. The second department neatly
sidestepped the Constitutional considerations posed by the agreement when it declined to
enforce it on a parens patriae basis.
64. 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446 N.E.2d 136, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817
(1983).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 115, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75. It should be noted
that the New York Court of Appeals has followed the same "neutral principles of law"
analysis in a recent case concerning a church property dispute. First Presbyterian Church
v. United Presbyterian, 62 N.Y.2d 110, 120, 464 N.E.2d 454, 459-60 cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1037 (1984).
67. Warmflash, supra note 5, at 248.
68. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1986).
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applied to a husband's refusal to grant a Jewish divorce, the law affects
the "establishment" of religion, since it compels the husband to take
part in a religious rite.69 In situations where the husband has converted
to another religion, there is a clear violation of his right to freely practice
his chosen religion.
More broadly, the law does not pass the three-prong test, prohibiting
excessive governmental entanglement in religion, which the Supreme
Court set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.70 The first prong requires that
the law have a secular purpose. Since New York state has a policy of
encouraging remarriage, this prong may be met.71 The New York law
also meets the second prong, which prohibits government action primarily
advancing or inhibiting religion. Section 7 of the law prohibits an entry
of final judgment if the clergyman who married the couple testifies
that to the best of his knowledge, the plaintiff has failed to remove all
barriers to the defendant's remarriage. 72 Such an entitlement of power
to a clergyman or minister clearly advances religion. According to the
law, therefore, the clergyman can at least delay the divorce trial, if not
stop it altogether.73 The third prong of Lemon v. Kurtzman prohibits
any government action which entangles the government with religion to
an excessive degree.74 The law fails this prong. Because the clergyman's
affidavit can delay or stop the divorce decree,75 the court must consider
evidence of the existence of religious barriers. Furthermore, the statute
provides that the clergyman must be alive and available to testify in
order for his sworn statement to be entered into the case. Consequently,
an excessive entanglement does exist.76
Ordering specific performance of a contractually provided get is the
best alternative for Jewish women as the law now stands. Only the bet
din, working in conjunction with civil tribunals, can exercise the power
necessary to resolve the conflict of constitutional prohibition with reli-
gious requirements. The position of the parties remains intolerable
without the bet din.
IV. CONCLUSION
The American Jewish population is again turning to the bet din to
resolve domestic problems. Jewish couples must still fulfill the require-
69. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
70. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
71. Warmflash, supra note 5, at 252. But see Note, supra note 24, at 206.
72. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253(7) (McKinney 1986).
73. Warmflash, supra note 5, at 252. See also Note, supra note 24, at 206.
74. Warmflash, supra note 5, at 252.
75. Note, supra note 24, at 206.
76. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1986).
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ments for obtaining a civil divorce in order to effectively change their
legal status. No viable alternative exists, however, to the bet din for
Jewish couples desiring to forge a link between a legal divorce and a
religious divorce. Without a resolution to this problem, Jewish women
initiating a divorce would be outcasts from their religion and unable to
marry again within their faith. Secular courts have tried several methods
to meet the needs of the Jewish faithful. The most effective method
appears to be court enforcement of a ketubah provision stipulating that
the parties would submit to a bet din in event of any disputes. This is
the approach the Avitzur court took. Of course, this method is only
effective when parties include the provision in a ketubah or a settlement
agreement, and not all Jewish couples do so. Jewish individuals entering
into a ketubah must protect their interests by insisting that settlement
agreements, or ketubah, are drafted to include a get provision. Courts
must recognize the necessity of encouraging and supporting the get,
without compelling it, and parties must include a bet din provision in
their ketubah or settlement agreements. In this way, courts can recognize
both the public policy concerns which the New York get statute attempts
to address, and the needs of the Jewish faithful.
Jennifer A. Hardin
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